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443 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1994).
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
George Frederick Buck was convicted in the
Circuit Court of Chesterfield County of possession
of cocaine with the intent to distribute and sentenced
to forty years and a $15,000 fine. He appealed al-
leging in part that the Commonwealth used its pe-
remptory strikes to remove two of the three Afri-
can-Americans from the jury panel because of their
race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.'
A three judge panel of the court of appeals re-
versed the conviction, concluding that the prosecu-
tor did not overcome the prima fade case of dis-
crimination.2 In order to establish a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination, the defendant must
show that: 1) the defendant is a member of a cogni-
zable racial group; 2) the prosecutor used peremp-
tory challenges to strike members of the defendant's
race from the jury pool; and 3) these and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor excluded members of the jury pool be-
cause of their race 3
Satisfied that Buck fulfilled this obligation, the
panel then analyzed the burden placed on the pros-
ecutor to give race neutral explanations for striking
a twenty-eight year old black female and a forty-
four year old black male. As to the first of these
strikes, the prosecutor evinced concern that the
juror's relative youth and lack of children would
make her less susceptible to the Commonwealth's
viewpoint than a parent with older children. 4 As to
the second strike, the prosecutor based his decision
on the juror's appearance and residence address as
evidence of a heightened toleration for drug of-
fenses.5
1 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2 Buck v. Commonwealth, 415 S.E.2d 229, 232 (Va.
Ct. App. 1992).
3 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
4 Buck v. Commonwealth, 432 S.E.2d 180, 182 (Va.
Ct. App. 1993).
SId.
6 380 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
7 Buck, 415 S.E.2d at 232-33.
8 421 S.E.2d 468 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
The panel took issue with the prosecutor's ra-
tionale citing Jackson v. Commonwealth6 for the
proposition that Batson would not be accommodated
if the trial judge were simply to "rubber stamp" all
of the prosecutor's race neutral explanations. Be-
cause the prosecutor neglected to strike a twenty-
three year old white female juror, and failed to ra-
tionally explain why a person living in a particular
area would be more tolerant of drugs, the panel con-
cluded there was insufficient support in the record
to find that the explanations given were race-neu-
tral-7
The Commonwealth received a rehearing, en
banc, and in a six to four decision, the court of ap-
peals reversed the panel and affirmed the trial court.
In a brief opinion recounting much of the inter-
change between the attorneys and the trial judge,
the majority cited Winfield v. Commonwealth8 as
controlling. There, the court of appeals relied on
the United States Supreme Court decision,
Hernandez v. New York9 which reaffirmed Batson and
provided a standard for appellate courts to review
trial judges' rulings on peremptory challenges.
Buck appealed his sentence to the Virginia Su-
preme Court.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court ruled to affirm the
decision of the court of appeals, en banc, citing Rule
5:25, Sup.Ct.Rules,'0 as a procedural bar preclud-
ing Buck from raising on appeal arguments not made
at trial." In addition, the court refused to conclude
that the trial judge's findings were "dearly errone-
ous," and instead cited Hernandez and Batson as au-
9 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (deeming prosecutor's strik-
ing of two Spanish-speaking Latinos because he doubted
whether they could defer to the official translator to be
race neutral).
10 "Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the
trial court or the commission before which the case was
initially tried unless the objection was stated with reason-
able certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good
cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of
justice." Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
" Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va.
1994).
thority imposing on the defense the burden of prov-
ing purposeful discrimination.' z
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. How meaningful an inquiry?
In a six to one decision, the Virginia Supreme
Court referred to the opportunity provided at trial
for Buck to explain why the reasons proffered by
the prosecutor were pretextual.13 Since Buck failed
to inform the trial judge that "the reasons advanced
were pretextual because they were inconsistently
applied" and that the reasons were grounded on "an
improper assumption of toleration for drug-related
crimes, or erroneous inferences drawn from the
wearing of an athletic jacket," he was precluded from
asserting them on appeal.'
4
Prior to the Virginia Supreme Court's consider-
ation of Buck, there appeared to be a fundamental
difference of opinion on how to apply the language
of Batson once a prima facie case was shown. The
United States Supreme Court has made it the duty
of the trial court "to determine if the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination." s How this
obligation is to be carried out was of principal im-
portance to some of the dissenters in the appellate
court's en banc decision, and to the majority of the
panel finding a Batson violation in Buck.
The court of appeals viewed the role of the trial
judge in exposing purposeful discrimination as an
affirmative duty requiring a "meaningful review."
Although the trial judge had access to the jury lists
containing information concerning the remaining
white jurors, he "made no further inquiry of the pros-
ecutor," nor did he "state even in a perfunctory fash-
ion the trial tactic that he found to be 'legitimate'
and furthered by the strike."' 6 As Judge Koontz noted
in his dissent, "[a]t a minimum, a meaningful re-
view requires that the explanation given by the pros-
ecutor for finding a member of one race objection-
able is equally applied to a member of another
race."'
7
The contrasting views on the role of the trial
judge in a case where purposeful discrimination is
alleged is starkly highlighted by a comparison of the
12 Id.
13 Id. at 415. The defense conceded that the reasons
given by the prosecutor were race-neutral, therefore, the
review by the Virginia Supreme Court was limited to
whether these reasons though race-neutral were
challengeable as being pretextual. See United States v.
Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991).
,4 Buck, 443 S.E.2d at 416.
court of appeal's handling of Buck and its treatment
of Broady v. Commonwealth3 8 decided only two
months earlier. In Broady, the Commonwealth used
all of its peremptory strikes to eliminate four black
jurors from the jury pool. Broady, an African-Ameri-
can, asserted a Batson challenge. The reason given
by the prosecutor as to three of the stricken jurors
was that their ages were in the same range as the
defendant's. Such proximity in age, the prosecutor
claimed, would tend to make the prospective jurors
more sympathetic to the defendant.
According to the Broady court, "Batson places
upon the trial courts the burden of weighing the
explanations tendered by prosecutors justifying their
use of peremptory strikes, assessing their genuine-
ness, and determining whether they bespeak dis-
criminatory motives." 9 Although review of the trial
court's decision should be upheld if supported by
credible evidence, the court noted that "when it is
further demonstrated that facially non-racial reasons
are applied systematically to blacks but not whites,
the Commonwealth has not overcome the presump-
tion that the strikes were racially motivated."20
Broady was granted a new trial because three white
jurors in the defendant's age group were not struck
by the prosecutor.
The principal difference between the three
strikes in Broady and the strike of the young child-
less female in Buck is that defense counsel alerted
the trial judge in Broady that there were whites left
remaining on the jury who were similarly situated
to the blacks removed by the prosecutor. It was
only then that the trial court's failure to make "fur-
ther inquiry" did not "overcome the presumption of
racial motivation for striking only black jurors."2' It
is clear that Buck permitted the court of appeals to
highlight its review of the Batson analysis and its
view of where the burden falls in a determination
of purposeful discrimination. Similarly, theVirginia
Supreme Court's handling of Buck's appeal sends
this message loud and clear, particularly since it re-
lied on a procedural bar, a mechanism applied se-
lectively by the court as the lone dissenter points
out.2
,s Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
16 Buck, 432 S.E.2d at 184 (Benton, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 188 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
1S 429 S.E.2d 468 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
,9 Id. at 470-71.
20 Id. at 471.
21 Id.
n Buck, 443 S.E.2d at 418.
The Virginia Supreme Court's desire not to rule
on the merits implies it used Buck to send a resound-
ing message to, practitioners in Virginia: Once a
prima facie case has been shown, it is incumbent
upon the moving party maintaining a Batson chal-
lenge to assert specific reasons why explanations
proffered by the opposition are pretextual. This
pronouncement is especially prominent given Buck's
comparison to Broady and the treatment of the
prosecutor's justifications by other courts.23
II. The limiting principle of Hernandez
Relied upon in both the court of appeals and
the Virginia Supreme Court decisions, Hernandez v.
New York established a standard for appellate courts
to review peremptory challenges. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the plurality in Hernandez, contended
that "[i]n the typical peremptory challenge inquiry,
the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-
neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge
should be believed."2 4 Because there will rarely be
evidence sufficient to decide the issue, Kennedy
believed the best evidence to demonstrate an
explanation's believability required observation of
the attorney exercising the challenge "As with the
state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's
state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies
'peculiarly within a trial judge's province' ' 2
Hernandez linked the deference afforded fed-
eral district court judges' findings of intentional dis-
crimination in federal civil cases to state courts' find-
ings connected to a federal constitutional daim.
26
Likewise, the standard of review applied by appel-
late courts in federal and state court judgments of
intentional discrimination is the same; factual find-
ings of the trial court will be upheld unless "clearly
erroneous."
Some have interpreted the effect of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hernandez to constrict the vi-
ability of the Batson challenge. Justice Stevens, in
his Hernandez dissent, perceived the decision as
imposing "on the defendant the added requirement
that he generate evidence of the prosecutor's actual
subjective intent to discriminate."27 An analysis of
21 See Thomas v. State, 555 So.2d 320 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1989) (holding the striking of unmarried jurors is
suspect and insufficient to justify a strike unless all single
venire members are struck); Williams v. State, 548 So.2d
501 (Ala. 1989) (ruling that living in a high crime area
insufficient as justification for peremptory strike).
24 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (citing Wainwright v.
Wit, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)).
25 Id.
lower federal court decisions involving Batson chal-
lenges since Hernandez revealed two pertinent sta-
tistical points: a decrease from 22.5% to ten per-
cent in the number of decisions where prima facie
cases of discrimination were found and an increase
from thirty-six percent to sixty-two percent in the
number of decisions where race-neutral reasons were
accepted.28
Although at least one Virginia appellate court
judge has argued that Hernandez should not pre-
vent a state from using its own procedures and rules
of evidence to decide, as a matter of state law,
whether a prosecutor's explanations are race-neu-
tral,29 this view does not appear to have much sup-
port. Both the court of appeals and the Virginia
Supreme Court appear to have adopted Hernandez's
federal standard of appellate review.
CONCLUSION
In this case the Virginia Supreme Court defini-
tively states the law on the role of counsel and of
the trial judge in cases once a Batson challenge has
been maintained. It is henceforth the affirmative
duty of the party asserting purposeful discrimina-
tion to proffer reasons why explanations given are
pretextual; only then must the trial judge make the
appropriate review.
Armed with the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of Hernandez, the Virginia Supreme Court
selected a less intrusive appellate review. Applica-
tion of the "clearly erroneous" standard to state
courts' findings of intentional discrimination has, in.
effect, licensed the containment of the Batson in-
quiry. This principle is easily likened to the Supreme
Court's use of the contemporaneous-objection rule
in the treatment of federal habeas cases. Both have
the "effect of making the state trial on the merits
the 'main event' so to speak, rather than a 'tryout
on the road' for what will later be the determina-
tive . . . hearing."30 Whether reversal will be
awarded to only the most blatant violations remains
to be seen, yet the net result is a tightening of pro-
cedure in resolving issues of purposeful discrimina-
tion.
2 Id. at 365-366.
27 Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2s Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and
Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis.
L. Rev. 511, 605 (1994).
2 Winfield, 421 S.E.2d at 476 (Coleman, J., dissent-
ing).
30 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
In dealing with peremptory challenges, the on-
going struggle is to find an appropriate balance be-
tween the protection of the constitutional rights of
identifiable racial groups in the selection of jurors,
and a standard of appellate review which maintains
the stability of the judicial process by conferring great
deference to a trial court's findings.
3'
3' Buck, 432 S.E.2d at 188 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
For the present, the Virginia Supreme Court has
struck the balance in favor of greater deference to
the trial court and has firmly placed the burden of
proving purposeful discrimination on the challenger
in the process.
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